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ABSTRACT. Historiography of education is not only a question of construction
but also of selection. In 19th century ‘‘history of education’’ was typically a genre of
‘‘great educators’’, mostly male and only marginally female. This construct is in-
ﬂuential up to now, at least in popular contexts of educational reasoning. The article
discusses in the introductory section problems of selection of names and meanings
within history of education, and then three types of historiographical writing that are
not only concerned with ‘‘great educators’’ but have larger Philosophical impact. The
ﬁrst type is Herman Nohl’s history of German progressive education, the second one
is Emile Durkheim’s history of Higher Education in France, and the third one is
George Herbert Mead’s Movements of Thought in 19th Century. The article com-
pares them and discusses their implications for further development of historical
writing in education.
KEY WORDS: Historiography, history of philosophy of education, methodology
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HISTORY OF EDUCATION AND THE PROCESS
OF SELECTION
Education in the present is often been designed in earlier epochs and
does not, therefore, have inherent power alone. Certainly, practice
should help to shape the future, but theory has historical references
that are supposed to be authoritative in designing the future. Edu-
cation is thus bound normatively to its own history, in the sense that
reference to particular authors and their works is supposed to provide
justiﬁcation for what is practiced today and what will be practiced
tomorrow. Often, these are authors that not only produced literary
works, but, at the same time, can refer to their own practice of
education. For the most part, it is this combination of writings and
practice that is the condition that lends the authors credibility – we
can think of Pestalozzi, Fro¨bel, Leo Tolstoi, or Maria Montessori.
What is seen as ‘‘exemplary’’, however, are not only certain authors
and their practices, but rather entire historical epochs.
A central point of orientation for today’s education is progressive
education of the late 19th and earlier 20th centuries. This is held to be
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the start of the ‘‘new education’’, which is supposed to be the deter-
mining inﬂuence up to today and to which one must inevitably refer in
almost every connection. This Reformpa¨dagogik (reform pedagogy),
as progressive, or child-centered, education is called in Germany,
however, is not, simply, a historical fact. It is a historical construct of
historiography. The historiography has compressed very many, very
heterogeneous developments, events, and elements into one educa-
tional universe that supposedly emerged between 1880 and 1890 and
persists on up to today. When ‘‘progressive education’’ is discussed,
however, much more is being evoked than the assumed start of an
epoch. As a rule, mentioning the epoch means that, at the same time,
an entire historiographical myth is being taken into account.
This myth has four characteristics:
• emphasis on charismatic founding ﬁgures,
• a spirit of the ‘‘new’’,
• connected with innovative practices, and
• educational movements that are named after their founders.
Most of the practices and movements that were founded have been
forgotten today. Those that have survived are, in retrospect, given a
high value through an interested historiography and idealized as an
outstanding epoch. This is true, from for instance Nohl (2002) to
Berube (1994) or Gauthier/Tardif (1996, p. 149ﬀ.), who stand for an
voluminous international literature that has determining inﬂuence.1
Here, the epoch of progressive education is held to be a legitimate,
and perhaps the only, source of today’s innovations, which in this
way become ﬁxed to their forerunners without consideration of the
peculiarities of the historiography of education. The historiography is
simply taken naively as a given. A particular version of the past serves
thus to legitimize present and future, without being put to the test.
The standard historiography of progressive education takes on
exclusive interpretative power, and it is, at the same time, highly
selective, even though the selection process has no rational basis.
An example will quickly illustrate the point. In 1934 an anthology
by Trevor Blewitt called The Modern Schools Handbook was pub-
1 In addition to the traditional body of literature, there is a growing historiography
of education on the Internet. Many of the sites are connected with progressive
education because it rouses the most interest. Only a few sites are scholarly, most of
them just promote progressive education and thereby use the historiographical
schema of ‘‘old’’ and ‘‘new’’ education. See for example: The`mes et ﬁgures de
l’e´ducation nouvelle http://goelano.chez.tiscali.fr/3-Instuado/Educatnouvelle.htm.
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lished in London. The volume presents progressive education schools
founded in England that were designed to be alternatives to the state
school and its maxims. Some of the schools were founded in the late
19th century, others after World War I, all are called ‘‘new schools’’.
In the preface, the editor writes that the modern schools shared three
features in common:
• they rejected the learning ideals of the conventional public school,
• laid emphasis on the natural needs of the child, and
• believed that through education, we can change the world
(Blewitt, 1934, p. 9).
My point is not whether or not these assumptions are naı¨ve, but
rather how these schools and their ideas were handled subsequently –
what survived in the educational memory and what did not. Radical
education in England was not just a national movement; it can be
demonstrated that many of the founding ﬁgures had international
contacts and orientations. These ﬁgures were the headmasters or
headmistresses of smaller and larger private schools, that are called
‘‘radical’’. In the twenties radical schools caused a sensation among
the public, for they aimed to realize something that was seen as
impossible, namely, a liberal education that was based on the needs
of the child.
Some of the better-known ﬁgures on this scene were:
• John Badley, founder of the Bedales School, the ﬁrst coeducational
‘‘new school’’ in England,
• W.B. Curry, since 1931 headmaster of the largest alternative
school, namely Dartington Hall School, founded by Leonhard and
Dorothy Elmhirst,
• Dora Russell, feminist, outstanding author, and founder (with
husband Bertrand Russell) and head of Beacon Hill School,
• Beatrice Baker, head of Badminton School, a progressive girls’
school,
• C.H.C. Sharp, head of Abbotsholme School, the ﬁrst ‘‘new school’’
in England, founded in 1889 by Cecil Reddie and model for the
German Landerziehungsheime (rural boarding schools),
• V. Hyett, co-head of the King Alfred School in London, which in
the 1920s was the best-known progressive school in England,
• Paul Roberts, headmaster of Frensham Heights School, an exper-
iment in combining school reform with extensive internal
democratization,
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• T.F. Coade, headmaster of Bryanston School, a Christian ‘‘new
school’’ focusing on creative learning and personal freedom.
Most of these names are unfamiliar even to specialized historians
of education.2 Internet searching retrieves comprehensive informa-
tion only on Dora Russell, wife of English philosopher Bertrand
Russell, whose literary career was mainly outside the ﬁeld of peda-
gogy. Of the 21 ‘‘modern schools’’ and names in Blewitt’s Modern
Schools Handbook, only one name is still very familiar today, namely,
Alexander Neill, headmaster of Summerhill School. Actually, Alex-
ander Neill is far more than ‘‘familiar’’; he is a central ﬁgure in
international progressive education, missing in no encyclopedia of
education, and his name and school call up a legend, even a mythos,
that overshadows all other names in English progressive education.
This would not have been expected or predicted in the 1930s. Neill
was one among many in the progressive education constellation,
which in contrast to the public schools was no more than a peripheral
phenomenon that received a lot of publicity.
Here it is important to consider national diﬀerences and pecu-
liarities in historiography. In Germany, Alexander Neill became one
of the known, charismatic progressive educationalists listed in the
encyclopedias only after 1969. In Herman Nohl’s3 standard work on
progressive education, published in a ﬁrst edition in 1933,4 Neill does
not exist, which can easily be explained by the fact that Nohl was
2 Recent studies of the schools and their staﬀs are available for Dartington Hall
(De la Iglesia, 1996) and King Alfred School (Brooks, 1998).
3 Herman Nohl (1879–1960) studied history, German philology, and philosophy in
Berlin and earned a doctorate with a dissertation on Socrates and the ethics of
Wilhelm Dilthey. In 1908 he completed a habilitation thesis on worldviews in
painting under Rudolf Eucken in Jena. In Jena Nohl had contact with the German
youth movement, and after 1919, together with Heinrich Weinel and Richard
Buchwald he founded the ﬁrst Volkshochschule [adult education center]. In 1920
Nohl was called to the University of Go¨ttingen as professor in ‘‘practical philosophy
with special focus on pedagogy’’, which in 1922 became a full professorship in
pedagogy, which Nohl held up to 1949. In 1937 he was forced to retire, but in 1945
he was reinstated as professor of pedagogy. Nohl is the main representative of the so-
called geisteswissenschaftliche Pa¨dagogik and founder of the Go¨ttingen School of
Education, which was and still is decisive inﬂuence in German pedagogy.
4 Die pa¨dagogische Bewegung in Deutschland [History of the Educational Move-
ment in Germany] (Nohl/Pallat, 1933, pp. 302–374). Die pa¨dagogische Bewegung in
Deutschland und ihre Theorie, ﬁrst published in 1935, contains the original manual
article plus a second article, ‘‘Theorie der Bildung’’, which was also published in 1933
(ibid., pp. 3–80).
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treating the ‘‘pedagogical movement’’ in Germany. However, Nohl
does include John Dewey, Maria Montessori, Helen Parkhurst, Ellen
Key, Emile Jaques-Dalcroze, Cecil Reddie, and William James, none
of whom were protagonists in any kind of ‘‘pedagogical movement’’
in Germany. Why were these particular ﬁgures selected for inclusion?
Why does the selection not include Neill, whose writings were cer-
tainly quite well known in the 1920s?5 These questions are not
irrelevant; Nohl’s interpretation of the history of Reformpa¨dagogik
continues, 70 years later, to shape both the subsequent historio-
graphy and the utilization of historiography in the education and
training of teachers.
Dewey, Montessori, Parkhurst and Reddie are perceived in a pe-
culiar way, namely, outside of their contexts. Nohl mentions them in
passing, always in service of conﬁrming or delimiting German pro-
gressive education. Foreign authors are not presented in their own
right, that is, with an account of the topics that they dealt with. Nohl
cites only names and no discursive connections that would give the
reader any information about the problems and theories the authors
addressed. Nohl’s selection can be explained by the following: the
names of international progressive education are used in an illus-
trative fashion and related to German issues; anything that does not
ﬁt, such as Neill’s pedagogy of freedom, Nohl simply does not
mention (and probably does not even have knowledge of ).
The names of John Dewey and Maria Montessori can be found in
Nohl in a section that is introduced as follows (freely translated here):
No idea of German pedagogy has found as great a response abroad than the idea of
the Arbeitsschule [work school, vocational school]. One can say that all nations are
coming together in this idea, and it is interesting to observe how, upon the common
ground of this idea, the various individualities, both personal and national, develop
(Nohl, 2002, p. 63).
Nohl provides four examples of this export achievement of German
pedagogy: Blonskij’s industrial school, the Henry Ford Trade School
in Detroit, Maria Montessori’s ‘‘Children’s House’’ in Rome, and
Helen Parkhurst’s Dalton Plan. Underlying these models were certain
theories that Nohl describes as having caused ‘strong reactions in the
5 Neill’s ﬁrst book, A Dominie’s Log, was published in 1915; by 1933, seven further
books and numerous articles in progressive education journals had been published. It
is not known whether Nohl had access to these works. Peter Petersen is known to
have been part of the Neill reception in Germany; they were both members of the
New Education Fellowship founded in 1921.
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German world of education’, although often ‘as a muddled mess.’
Nohl ﬁnds worthy of mention the theories of ‘the Swiss Ferrie`re, the
Belgian Decroly, and foremost, the American Dewey’ (ibid., p. 64).
No citations are given for the theories, and they do not appear in
the bibliography. None of these authors had written a theory of the
‘‘work school’’. The core of Adolphe Ferrie`re’s Ecole active is not
‘‘work’’, as in the German work school, but rather self-activity; Ovide
Decroly described reorganization of the school based upon the
interests of children and not upon the principle of work; John Dewey,
as is generally known, focused on the relationship between democ-
racy and education in his theory. The authors that Nohl mentions
had nothing to do with the German ‘‘work school’’, which went back
to the middle of the 19th century, had only little to do with pro-
gressive education and cannot be seen as an inﬂuential model ex-
ported to other countries. What happens, however, when this
representation is contained in a standard history of education and
achieves encyclopedic status?
It is easy to retrace Nohl’s strategy: Ferrie`re’s La loi bioge´netique
et l’e´ducation (1910), based on his dissertation in Geneva,6 was
translated into German in 1912 under the title of Biogenetik und
Arbeitsschule [Biogenetics and Work School], which was merely an
adaptation to German semantics and had nothing to do with what
Nohl meant by ‘‘Arbeitsschule’’. By the time Nohl had collected his
material for his history of progressive education, only a few essays by
Decroly were available in German translation.7 Nohl obviously
brought the didactic concept of ‘‘self-activity’’ into connection with
the work school. Dewey was available in German translation early
on, and not a single German title pointed to the idea of the ‘‘Ar-
beitsschule’’. But because Georg Kerschensteiner had referred to
Dewey in a number of his works, Nohl assigns Dewey to the ‘‘work
school movement’’ as well.
Dewey is thus sorted into a category, but not received, even
though Nohl states explicitly that there were theories, and not just
names, behind the ‘‘muddled mess’’. But spiritual theories like Fer-
rie`re’s,8 empirical theories like Decroly’s, and pragmatic theories like
Dewey’s disrupt the historiographic construction that is Nohl’s
6 La loi du progre`s en biologie et sociologie (1902).
7 Nohl did not read French educational texts, apparently.
8 ‘‘Spiritual’’ also in the sense of ‘‘esoteric’’; Ferrie`re’s concept of education is
discussed in Hameline (1993).
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starting point. This construction is of interest, since it supports his
historiography that bases on persons and ideas, which are assigned to
epochs. What in the German-speaking world is known as the Ge-
schichte der Pa¨dagogik [history of education] and continues to be a
very inﬂuential genre (Oelkers, 1999) goes back to the romantic his-
toriography at the beginning of the 19th century. Nohl utilizes this
genre to form his own construction of German Reformpa¨dagogik, or
progressive education.
HERMAN NOHL’S HISTORY OF THE EDUCATION
MOVEMENT IN GERMANY
Nohl’s focus on Germany is not by chance; it was programmatic. The
foreign versions of the ‘‘new education’’ in the early 20th century do
not have the German meanings, namely, education towards Volk
[nation] and Gemeinschaft [community]. For substantiating this kind
of education, a powerful historiographic construction has been
available right on up to today: Nohl views the ‘‘educational move-
ment’’ as the striving to reestablish national unity. The primary
determining inﬂuence on the movement is the German Movement,9
as Nohl’s teacher Wilhelm Dilthey had put it, referring to that epoch
of literature, philosophy, and the arts between 1770 and 1830
during which the foundations of a national culture, or the ‘‘German
spirit’’ were laid. Nohl interprets the societal-cultural developments
of the 19th century as dramatic cultural decline. The German spirit
found no political ‘‘body’’, for society was ripped apart by industri-
alization and civilization. Only the pedagogical movements at the end
of the century, among them the work school movement, attempted to
recreate that unity. All of these movements, although they had
completely diﬀerent orientations, worked towards the same goal.
The ‘‘new education’’ is said to arise from criticism, not from
practice, and certainly not from theory. The historiography of
German Reformpa¨dagogik as initiated by Nohl speaks of Kulturkritik
[cultural criticism] or ‘‘educational criticism’’, that supposedly, at the
end of the 19th century, gave a new direction to the educational
9 Wilhelm Dilthey: Die dichterische und philosophische Bewegung in Deutschland
1770–1800 (Inaugural lecture in Basel 1867). It is of interest that Dilthey brings the
term ‘‘educational movement’’ into close association with Prussian state education
(Die deutsche Aufkla¨rung im Staat und in der Akademie Friedrichs des Grossen,
Deutsche Rundschau April/Mai 1901).
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reform discussion, changing it forever. Triggering the new discussion
were neither new theories nor practical experiments, but criticism.
Cultural criticism is supposed to have made educational reforms
seem necessary. Assumptions about the decadence of, or the general
crisis of, culture are said to have resulted in demands for new edu-
cation.
Three names are almost always mentioned in connection with
Kulturkritik, as these thinkers are said to have been its main repre-
sentatives: Paul de Lagarde, Julius Langbehn and Friedrich Nietz-
sche. Nohl’s historiography refers only to German ﬁgures;
Kulturkritik is seen as a national phenomenon of the end of the 19th
century. Nohl (1933, p. 305ﬀ.) writes that the three ﬁgures listed
above had articulated a consciousness of crisis, to which, subse-
quently, the educational movements could respond. Cultural criti-
cism, says Nohl, was directed at culture as a whole (ibid., p. 305);
accordingly, the educational movements had to be seen as a living
unity (ibid., p. 307) and thus also seen as a whole. ‘‘Educational
movements’’ are unions of activists, who come to be known both
through their writings and their practice. They articulate, Nohl
writes, ‘‘new education’’ in the wake of and in the spirit of ‘‘cultural
criticism’’.
He is referring to, for example,
• the rural boarding schools movement
• the art education movement
• the movement of child-centered education [‘‘vom Kinde aus’’]
• the ‘‘internal school reform’’ movement, in particular the work
school movement
• the gymnastics and physical education movement.
All of these movements existed, under changing names and
using varied terminology, and their origins, sponsors, and eﬀects can
all be demonstrated, but in fact, the numbers were not great,
and their eﬀects were not overwhelming. The term Kulturkritik
implies a tangible and operative reality of reform, at the least a clearly
distinct power of discourse, that between 1880 and 1900 left its mark
intellectually on the groups mentioned and set them upon their
course. They took on the ‘‘consciousness of crisis’’, according
to Nohl, and bet on educational renewal, which was subsequently
realized, charismatically, by the founding fathers. New education thus
became one powerful movement which, in reality, it never was.
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History of education is construed with a historiographic schema.
This schema is taken over by Nohl’s pupils, such as Wolfgang
Scheibe, without the political contexts of National Socialism
(Scheibe, 1944) or democracy (Scheibe, 1969) changing the schema in
any fundamental way. In 1969 Scheibe listed three criteria for the
validity of the concept. It allows:
• criticism of the ‘‘one-sidedness’’ of intellectual education that
was ‘‘wholly’’ determined by science
• a ‘‘new’’ education ﬁlled with art
• ‘‘full’’ validity of the ‘‘irrational’’ side of life.
According to this, modern education must not allow itself to be
dictated by science, must take irrational experience into account,
foster the artistic side, and give up the claim to rationality. Therefore,
Kulturkritik is criticism of rationalism, intellectualism, and the ‘‘sci-
entiﬁcation’’ of education. While this implies that all three terms refer
to real trends, no proof of such trends can in fact be established.
Certainly such criticisms were brought forward throughout all of
the 19th century. From Friedrich Ru¨ckert10 to Friedrich Fro¨bel,
Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl,11 Karl Christian Planck,12 and Hugo
Go¨ring,13 many authors can be found that viewed ‘‘rationalism’’ and
‘‘scientiﬁc education’’ as national evils. And the reform pedagogy
strategies of ‘‘turning back’’ education were all widespread prior to the
cultural criticism. Experience and life were seen as standing in oppo-
sition to learning and school, more power was to be given to the
10 Friedrich Ru¨ckert (1788–1866), Orientalist in Berlin and teacher of Paul de
Lagarde, was the well-known author of, among other works, Haus- und Jahrespoesie,
which managed to connect patriotism with a child orientation.
11 Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl (1823–1897) was a cultural historian and author in
Munich. He directed the Bavarian National Museum from 1885 on. Riehl’s Natur-
geschichte des Deutschen Volkes [Natural history of the German nation] (1851ﬀ.)
contains all of the signiﬁcant motifs of the political ‘‘reform pedagogy’’ in Germany.
12 Karl Christian Planck (1819–1880) completed post-doctoral qualiﬁcations for
university teaching in philosophy in 1848 in Tu¨bingen. From 1856 he was professor
at the Gymnasium in Ulm, and in 1879 he became member of the Theological
Seminar in Blaubeuren. His Das Testament eines Deutschen [Testament of a German]
was published posthumously (1881). In it, Planck formulated a theory of the edu-
cational community, which virtually all of the German progressive educationalists
represented.
13 Hugo Go¨ring completed his habilitation at the University of Basel (1880) with a
thesis on Basedow. His book on the Neue deutsche Schule [New German School]
(1890) describes reform pedagogy avant la lettre.
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‘‘irrational’’, the aims were directed towards nation and community,
education was conceived of on the basis of ‘‘blood and soil’’ [Blut und
Boden], and ‘‘abstract’’ science was viewed as only inimical to the soul.
If the German historiography, particularly following Nohl, were
accurate, then reform pedagogy would be, in theory and practice:
• a national phenomenon,
• the positive reaction to nationalistic and Anti-Semitic ‘‘cultural
criticism’’,
• a backwards-looking ‘‘throw-back’’, which could appear in the
guise of ‘‘modernization’’,
• a unity of national ‘‘movements’’, and
• an original, unique complex that had never and nowhere else ap-
peared before.
According to this, German ‘‘reform pedagogy’’ had nothing, or
only negatively, to do with the theoretical and social innovations of
the 19th century, which are rejected wholesale. In Nohl (1933, p. 303)
the 19th century is a time of complete disintegration to which edu-
cation must come to the rescue. It is no accident that the point of
reference is the ‘‘inner mission’’ (ibid., pp. 303/304),14 meaning a kind
of pastoral ‘‘turning back’’. It was to lead to a new ideal that would,
it was said, ‘‘keep culture together’’ and lead culture back to its
origins. This ideal would work to counter the ‘‘mechanization, spe-
cialization, and historization’’ of what had become a ‘‘soul-less’’
education (ibid., p. 305), or in other words, in a positive formulation,
it would work to counter everything upon which the modern edu-
cational institutions were based.
Here it is interesting to note that other variants of ‘‘modern edu-
cation’’ could be suppressed or ignored, particularly those that turn
Nohl’s historiographic schema on its head, such as Wichard Lange’s15
‘‘modern pedagogy’’ of 1869. Langewas a follower of Froebel; Froebel
14 This refers to Johann Hinrich Wichern’s (1808–1881) manifesto on the social
pedagogic movement of the ‘‘inner mission’’ of 1849. In 1848, he founded the Central
Committee of the Inner Mission.
15 Wichard Lange (1826–1884) was the headmaster of an urban school (Real-
schule) in Hamburg and the ﬁrst publisher of Friedrich Froebel’s works. Following
the death of Diesterweg (1866) Lange took over editorship of the Rheinischen Bla¨tter
fu¨r Erziehung und Unterricht, founded in 1827 and one of the leading journals for
teachers in Germany in the 19th century. The article ‘‘Die Autonomie der modernen
Pa¨dagogik’’ is based on a lecture that Lange held in 1869 at the Allgemeine Deutsche
Lehrerversammlung [General Teachers’ Assembly] in Kassel.
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was for Nohl the central source of child-centered pedagogy, but
Lange’s own ‘‘modern pedagogy’’ is omitted, even though it was based
on ‘‘natural, free development of the child’’, focused on learning, and
posited a theory of human potentials that were to be developed
‘‘harmonically’’ and holistically (Lange, 1884, p. 114ﬀ.). However, in
contrast to Froebel, Nohl does not take Lange as a historiographic
point of reference. It was not necessary to trace back to him, and he
could be forgotten.
In order to see progressive education as more than merely a
reaction to and essentially against the processes of modernization,
you would have to take a diﬀerent position, and it would be fun-
damental to take the new theories of the 19th century into consid-
eration that grew up with and around Darwin and the emergence
of the theory of evolution. It is characteristic of German educa-
tional theory that it does not move in that direction and instead
holds on to its traditional (Protestant) concepts, such as ‘‘soul,
spirit’’ [Geist] and ‘‘community’’, without connecting them to evo-
lutionary theory.
In the philosophy of education, evolutionary theory also stands
for abandoning Platonism. Nohl’s historiography is still ‘‘Platonic’’,
except that the ‘‘guiding ideas’’ were not taken from Platon’s soul,
but from history. History is said to have the decisive inﬂuence on the
present, in the sense that it guides educational movements and thus
assures their intrinsic soundness. This requires, of course, historical
continuity, or in other words, spiritual concepts must remain eﬀective
down through the generations. Not only German historiography
found it diﬃcult to register that precisely this construction had be-
come questionable with the 19th century, as can be shown by core
concepts of education of ‘‘child’’, ‘‘childlike’’, ‘‘development’’, ‘‘per-
sonality’’, and the ‘‘education’’ associated with these concepts. They
had to be understood, in the second half of the 19th century, in a new
way, independently of ideas and, in particular, independently of the
Protestant reasoning that underlay education.
DURKHEIM AND MEAD: TWO ANTI-PLATONIC
HISTORIES OF EDUCATION
There are at least two versions of classical historiography of educa-
tion that are not guided and constrained by Platonic convictions. One
of them starts out from the history of science, and the other refers to
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the history of society. What is typical of the two variants is that
neither is a ‘‘history of ideas’’ in the old sense. For each variant
there are outstanding examples, which had a decisive inﬂuence on
education, but they are not found in the German-speaking realm.
They are:
• George Herbert Mead: Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth
Century (1936) and
• E´mile Durkheim: L’e´volution pe´dagogique en France (1938) (in
German translation Die Entwicklung der Pa¨dagogik (1977a); in
English translation,The Evolution of Educational Thought (1977b)).
Durkheim (1977a, p. 23) starts out from Friedrich Paulsen’s
Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts [History of Higher Learning] and
gives an account of the development of higher education in France.
The history has ﬁve main points of orientation:
• Carolingian reforms of the 8th and 9th centuries,
• emergence of the Medieval university,
• humanistic education of the Renaissance,
• inﬂuence of Jesuit scholarship on European intellectual life of the
16th and 17th centuries,
• rise of the concept of public education in the 18th century, which
found realization in France with the formation of the secular
public school starting in the 19th century.
In this view, the ‘‘new schools’’ of progressive education repre-
sented a mere episode, an episode of which Durkheim was indeed
critical at the end of his life. His essay ‘‘E´cole de demain’’ (Durkheim,
1916) is directed against the persisting inﬂuence of the humanistic
idea of education that starts out from the uniﬁed nature of man and
centers on the cult of the human personality (Durkheim, 1977a,
p. 301). Precisely that had been the emphasis of reform pedagogy, for
which the expression ‘‘educational cult’’ is quite an apt description.
The focus is on the child that is supposed to be educated in accor-
dance with its nature.16 Durkheim rebuﬀs that it is not possible to
teach the child ‘‘human nature in general’’ (ibid., p. 302), nor can the
child itself be seen in this way. Rousseau was in error, and thus his
theory could not be the basis of reform pedagogy, as is assumed in
the main up to the present (Oelkers, 2002).
16 Precisely that idea has come under criticism today (Egan, 2002).
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For Durkheim, the presumed ‘‘nature of the child’’ contradicts the
open character of human experience. He writes that once we realize
the inﬁnite variety of mental combinations that man takes from
nature, we know that it is impossible to state, at any particular mo-
ment in time, the exact composition of that nature, what is made up
of. For the wealth of past achievements do not allow us in any way to
set the limits of future achievements and to think that the day will
come when man will have reached his limits of its creative power and
will be doomed to forever repeat himself (Durkheim, 1977a, p. 304).
This does not mean that we should view school and teaching simply
as an exercise in creative expression, as did many progressive edu-
cators at the time. The creative development of man and the plasticity
of his nature is a general concept, not a school educational term. It
allows us to overcome the humanistic view of nature as static, but it
does not suﬃce as a basis for determining the syllabus in the public
schools or the content of the lessons.
For Durkheim, man can no longer be viewed as a system of
determinate and ﬁnite elements that would determine his nature. That
view confounds nature with ‘‘essence’’ and thus does not take the
history of cultural and social evolution into account. But it is pre-
cisely history that shows us the inﬁnite variability of human nature
(ibid., p. 303), and what it reveals is not, however, man’s ‘‘essence’’.
Being human must be understood as an inﬁnitely plastic and protean
potential, which under the pressure of ever-new conditions, can take
on the most varied aspects (ibid., p. 304). This protean force is the
ever-changing creation of self. In Homer’s Odyssey, Proteus is the
shape-changing, prophetic old man of the sea able to take on various
forms at will; he reveals his prophesies only to those who are clever
enough to hold him fast in one of his many forms.
E´mile Durkheim17 was the ﬁrst professor of education in France,
being given this appointment at the University of Bordeaux in 1887 at
17 E´mile Durkheim (1858–1917) was born into a Jewish family in Epinal in and
completed his baccalaure´at at the Colle`ge d’Epinal. He studied in Paris at the E´cole
Supe´rieure Normale and began teaching philosophy in 1882. He was called to
Bordeaux in 1887, where he taught up to 1902. Durkheim founded the ﬁrst social
science journal in France, Anne´e sociologique, in 1898. At the Sorbonne from 1902,
Durkheim was one of the most inﬂuential teachers, and his lecture courses were the
only required courses for students seeking degrees in philosophy, history, literature,
and languages. In addition, he was responsible for the education of a whole gener-
ation of French schoolteachers, in whom he instilled a rationalist, anti-metaphysical
pedagogy, which diﬀered radically from German pedagogy.
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the age of 27.18 In Bordeaux, up until his call to the Sorbonne, he held
lectures for ﬁfteen years on moral education, practical education,
applied psychology, education of the intelligence, or intellectual
education, whereby we know of only one historical lecture course,
which dealt with education of the 19th century. In 1902 Durkheim
began teaching at the Sorbonne in Paris and in 1916 was made
professor and given the chair of Science of Education, which would
be renamed ‘‘Science of Education and Sociology’’ in 1913. It was
here that he gave his lectures on the Histoire des doctrines pe´dagog-
iques, upon which Maurice Halbwachs, as editor, based its publica-
tion in 1938 (Durkheim, 1938).
Durkheim was a graduate of the E´cole Normale Supe´rieure. His
generation at the E´cole included the socialist republican Jean Jaure`s,
the philosopher Henri Bergson, and the historian Camille Jullian.
Durkheim’s ideas on man’s creative adaptation are strongly remi-
niscent of Bergson’s theory of e´volution cre´atrice, which was pub-
lished in 1907 in Paris. Although Durkheim distanced himself sharply
from Bergson’s ‘‘irrationalism’’, he in fact held a similar view that has
to do with applying evolutionary theory to culture and society. At the
core, every development is creative, because and insofar as planned
creation can no longer be assumed and, at the same time, the idea of
history as a paradox reservoir of timeless, universal experience has to
be rejected.
Durkheim (1889) reviewed the ﬁrst edition of Ferdinand To¨nnies’s
book Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft for the Revue philosophique in
1889.19 He criticized the typological contrasting of ‘‘community’’ and
‘‘society’’ and called it untenable. Society is one, which cannot be
divided into two social worlds of completely diﬀerent types. It is also
of interest that Durkheim, who was a proliﬁc reviewer, took notice of
the educational use of the German ideology of ‘‘Volksgemeinschaft’’
(community of the people) based on To¨nnies book only during the
18 In 1882 the University at Bordeaux had established the ﬁrst course in pedagogy
in France for prospective schoolteachers. It was ﬁrst taught by Alfred Epinas and
then by Durkheim from 1887. Durkheim was appointed as Charge´ d’un cours de
science sociale et de pe´dagogie. In addition to this primary responsibility, he also
taught a public lecture course in social science every Saturday morning, devoting his
lectures to special topics ranging, for example, from social solidarity to changes in
the family to ethnology of tribal societies. Durkheim wrote some of his major works
at Bordeaux, including De la division du travail social (1893), Les re`gles de la me´thode
sociologique (1895), and Le suicide: e´tude de sociologie (1897).
19 The review was published in English translation in 1972 (Durkheim, 1972).
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First World War (Durkheim, 1915) and criticized it using arguments
similar to John Dewey’s German Philosophy and Politics of the same
year. The rapidly growing body of international literature on pro-
gressive education after 1890 is practically absent in Durkheim’s re-
views. In contrast, he followed very closely the development of the
philosophy of Pragmatism (Durkheim, 1955).20
Modern science is research science, writes George Herbert Mead
in Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century,21 and that raises
problems for traditional philosophy, calling its concepts and doc-
trines into question. Research science is hypothetical learning; con-
cepts must be tested and cannot be assured; theories are not dogmas,
but rather temporary working hypotheses in the light of existent,
present experiences and facts. This means that every postulate can
turn into a problem; all assumptions are valid only ‘‘from the point of
view of the science of the time’’ (Mead, 1936, p. 265).22
Scientiﬁc inquiry in this sense begins with the Renaissance and
ﬁnally gains ascendance in the 19th century. The consequences for
philosophy are grave: ‘‘truth’’ is now a ‘‘working’’ truth that is
temporal and transitory; the traditional concept of ‘‘being’’ becomes
history; and ‘‘society’’ can no longer be understood on the basis of
feudal theories. Philosophy can interpret scientiﬁc results (ibid.,
p. 343), but it can neither replace them nor oﬀer alternatives to them.
One solution to this situation, says Mead, was Pragmatism as
developed by William James and John Dewey (ibid., p. 344f.). One of
its central insights relates to the theory of scientiﬁc experimental or
20 Pragmatisme et sociologie was the title of a lecture that Durkheim held at
Sorbonne in 1913/1914. It was published in an edited volume in 1955 based on
students’ lecture notes.
21 Movements of Thought, published after Mead’s death, is based for the most part
on stenographic notes from Mead’s lectures for undergraduate students at the
University of Chicago, which Mead had never prepared for publication. Mead held
his lecture on Movements of Thought in the 19th Century 19 times between the
summer of 1901 and spring 1930 (Lewis/Smith, 1980, App. 1, 2). His keen historical
interest found its roots in Wilhelm Dilthey’s lectures on the ‘‘History of Philosophy’’,
which he attended in Berlin in the summer semester of 1891. In the winter semester of
1890/91 Mead also attended Friedrich Paulsen’s lectures on education. Mead studied
in Leipzig and Berlin from 1888 to 1891.
22 ‘‘Science starts with certain postulates, but does not assume they are not to be
touched. There is no phase of the world as we know it in which a problem may not
arise, and the scientist is anxious to ﬁnd such a problem. He is interested not merely
in giving a systematic view of the world from a science already established but in
working out problems that arise. This is the attitude of research science’’ (Mead,
1936, pp. 265–266).
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hypothetical learning, which Mead expands to develop a general
model of education (Biesta, 1998; see also Tro¨hler/Oelkers, 2004).
‘‘Research science’’ and ‘‘education’’ are not two separate areas.
They both refer to an identical experience. Pragmatism calls upon
two sources:
‘‘The sources of the pragmatic doctrine are these: one is behavioristic psychology,
which enables one to put intelligence in its proper place within the conduct of form,
and to state that intelligence in terms of the activity of the form itself; the other is the
research process, the scientiﬁc technique, which comes back to the testing of a
hypothesis by its working… If we connect these two by recognizing that the testing
in its working-out means the setting-free of inhibited acts and processes, we can see
that both of them lead up to… a doctrine …, and that perhaps the most important
phase of it is this: that the process of knowing lies inside of the process of conduct’’
(Mead, 1936, pp. 351–352; italics J.O.).
For this reason, writes Mead, pragmatism has been spoken of as a
practical sort of philosophy, a sort of ‘‘bread-and-butter philosophy’’
(ibid., p. 352). It does not distinguish between thought and being or
between knowledge and action; ‘‘it brings the process of thought, of
knowledge, inside of conduct’’ (ibid., p. 352).
The theory is warranted on the basis of the research process or
learning through hypotheses on the one hand, and on the psychology
of Behaviorism as understood by John Dewey and William James
(ibid., p. 392ﬀ.) on the other.23 This is not John Watson’s theory of
conditioned learning based on his ‘‘behaviorist manifesto’’ of 1913,24
but rather a theory of intelligent adaptation that sees experience as a
temporal sequence (ibid., p. 392) and consciousness as emerging from
public communication, without rigorously rejecting intentionality
(ibid., p. 399ﬀ.).25
One of the main inﬂuences on the development of Pragmatism was
the shift in the nature of work in the rapidly developing industrial
society. The growing division of labor was concurrent with the pro-
23 Starting with: William James (1884). On Some Omissions of Introspective
Psychology. Mind 9, 1–26.
24 John B. Watson (1913). Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It. Psychological
Review 20, 157–177. Watson’s manifesto was based on animal psychology of the 19th
century as well as on experimental psychology as represented, for example, by the
work of James Baldwin.
25 The space about us is public, while intentions are private: ‘‘The intent which the
person has is not evident to the other person. He may make a guess at it, but it is only
the person … who knows deﬁnitely what he intends to do’’ (Mead, 1936, p. 401).
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cesses of urbanization and the attendant new formation of the public
consciousness. It was only in the modern city that the individual
could free himself from feudal control, as a day laborer receiving
money in return for his services. The wage belonged to him in terms
of his own eﬀort, under no feudal conditions at all (ibid., p. 175).
With the city, new forms of social control had to be built up (ibid.,
p. 176) that could be neither feudal nor ecclesiastical. This description
had its roots essentially in Georg Simmel’s Philosophie des Geldes26
which Mead had reviewed in the 1900/1901 volume of the Journal of
Political Economy. In that work, Simmel (1989, p. 379ﬀ.) had laid out
how the historical departure from an agrarian economy and the
manorial system brought with it the ‘‘freeing of the individual’’ (ibid.,
p. 138) under the conditions of the ‘‘general existence of the city’’
(ibid., p. 596).
For Simmel, fundamental to the public forms of the urban exis-
tence is individual and social ‘‘diﬀerentiation’’ (ibid., p. 631). The
classical view of society, as a closed entity or ‘‘body’’ that incorpo-
rates individuals in a lasting grip, no longer holds. We can also no
longer view individuals as ultimate, indivisible ‘‘monads’’ that are
untouched by the process of their experience. Simmel sees social
diﬀerentiation as both spatial and temporal; it occurs both in coex-
istence and in succession (ibid., p. 369), which can be observed in the
phenomena of the division of labor and in fashions.
Similarly, Mead holds that the gradual and continuous emergence
of capitalistic industrial society fundamentally changed the social
situation. Society, and thus education, can no longer be understood
according to the pattern of the ‘‘ancient house’’ (Mead, 1936, p. 185),
meaning closed and static. Social dynamics entered not only with
industry, but also with the modern economy oriented towards an
unlimited market. The new ‘‘economic community’’ of the 19th
century was more universal than any church, and it had no need for
metaphysical justiﬁcations (ibid., pp. 187/188). ‘‘Also, it brought
together people who were separated nationally, in language, in cus-
toms’’ (ibid., p. 188).
‘‘Society’’, however, is not the same thing as ‘‘market’’. In contrast
to Malthus, Mead makes it clear that freedom of exchange is not
26 The ﬁrst edition was published in 1900 by Duncker & Humblot, Leipzig; a
second expanded edition appeared in 1907. An English translation was published in
1990, co-translated by David Frisby (The Philosophy of Money, second edition, New
York: Routledge, 1995). One of the main chapters was published in English as early
as 1900.
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based on ‘‘natural laws’’ of economy. Work and capital do not follow
the simple tendencies of unceasing growth of wealth as well as
increasing impoverishment, but instead must be seen upon the
background of increasing diﬀerentiation and ongoing problem solv-
ing (ibid., p. 194ﬀ.). ‘‘Societies develop… by adjusting themselves to
the problems they ﬁnd before them’’ (ibid., pp. 365/366). Social
adaptation is always intelligent adaptation and therefore a process of
continuous learning.
‘‘When we reach the human form with its capacity for indicating what is important in
a situation, through the process of analysis; when we get to the position in which a
mind can arise in the individual form, that is, where the individual can come back
upon himself and stimulate himself just as he stimulates others; where the individual
can call out in himself the attitude of the whole group; where he can acquire the
knowledge that belongs to the whole community; where he can respond as the whole
community responds under certain conditions when they direct this organized
intelligence toward particular end; then we have this process which provides solu-
tions for problems working in a self-conscious way’’ (ibid., p. 366).
Mead is trying to connect the entire evolutionary process with
social organization (ibid., p. 372) and adaptation with intelligence.27
Modern society requires intelligent forms of social control that must
go beyond simple historical habits and patterns. Society is thus
cooperation, which is to be understood as a highly complex activity
based upon humans’ ability to take the attitude of the group to which
they belong, and it is not merely based upon gain or loss (ibid.,
p. 375). ‘‘Thinking’’ refers to ‘‘public consideration’’; ‘‘it is taking the
attitude of others, talking to other people, and then replying in their
language. That is what constitutes thinking’’ (ibid., pp. 375/ 376).28
This is the point where the theory of educationmust begin, meaning
that it must be linked with social theory, without relying on past
history. In the process of societal diﬀerentiation, tradition of educa-
tion loses its normative power. History is past solutions; it may yield
suggestions, but it cannot be understood as a binding tradition and
utilized for politization strategies. It oﬀers no assurance, reveals no
ﬁnal truths. Instead, history must be understood as an open research
problem. The German type of Geschichte der Pa¨dagogik (history of
pedagogy) is ﬁnal in character. It is not tenable in the face of the
information and knowledge that we have today nor does it stand up to
post-Platonic theories of development. We have no other choice than
27 The basic idea of ‘‘general intelligence’’ has its roots in animal psychology of the
19th century.
28 On the construction of the social mind, compare Valsiner/Veer (2000).
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to rewrite the history of education again and again and to put the
process of selection in historiography on as rational a basis as possible.
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